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THERE'S A COUPON FOR THAT: How COUPONS
FOR MEDICAL SERVICES ON DAILY DEAL WEBSITES
VIOLATE THE FEDERAL ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
Claudia Ahiabor*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Flaunt your beaming beauty with today's Groupon:
for $150, you get an in-office Zoom! teeth-whitening
treatment (an $800 value), x-rays (a $187 value),
and a new-patient exam (a $99 value) . . . (a $1,086
total value)."' Groupon, a portmanteau derived from
group and coupon, is a daily deal website where
customers can purchase coupons for goods and
services at local businesses.2 The Groupon business
model is relatively simple: a local business displays a
coupon on its website with a pre-determined amount
of coupons that must sell before the deal is applicable
to any buyer.3 Groupon gets a share of all coupons
sold and the local business gains new customers,
greater exposure, and increased market share.4 The
success of Groupon has led to the proliferation
of daily deal websites on the Internet, targeting
customers in specific cities or demographic groups.5
Moreover, these sites are attracting providers of
medical services, like general practitioners and
health testing centers, hoping to reap such benefits.6
Many coupons for medical services advertised
on daily deal websites do not raise anti-kickback
concerns since the advertised services are not
covered by Federal health care programs. However,
not all medical coupons advertised on daily deal
websites are lawful under the anti-kickback statute.
The Department of Health and Human Services,
Office of Inspector General ("OIG")- a government
agency charged with combating fraud, waste and
abuse in Federal health care programs - approved a
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proposed business arrangement akin to the daily deal
website model.7 In advisory opinion 12-02, the OIG
favorably opined on a website that displayed coupons
and advertisements from health care providers and
suppliers, exclusively, for items and services billable
to Federal health care programs.' However, the OIG
was careful to distinguish the proposed arrangement
from arrangements currently in effect that do raise
kickback concerns.9 The proposed arrangement
stated, among other things, that customers would
be able to print coupons that are only redeemable
after services are rendered.' 0 Customers would not
pre-pay for the services they seek and the website
would fully comply with the discount regulatory
safe harbor, which excludes certain transactions
from being considered "prohibited remuneration"
under the anti-kickback statute." The OIG found
this arrangement posed a low risk of fraud and
abuse under the anti-kickback statute because the
marketer is not a health care provider, payments
to the marketer did not depend on the volume or
value of business, advertising on the site would
be comparable to advertising in print media, and
providers would not be unduly influenced to provide
medically unnecessary services since customers
would not pre-pay for coupons.' 2 Under a similar
analysis, the current arrangement between daily deal
websites and providers of services billable to Federal
health care programs presents an unacceptable risk
of fraud and abuse because several important factors
intrinsic in advisory opinion 12-02 do not exist. 13
This article argues business arrangements between
daily deal websites and providers of medical services
nonetheless violate the anti-kickback statute because
they arrange for the use of services billable to
Federal health care programs through targeted
advertising activity.14 Furthermore, parties to this
arrangement, as currently structured, are unlikely
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to evade prosecution under the criminal and civil
penalties of the statute since these arrangements
follow a percentage compensation structure and do
not fall within applicable regulatory safe harbors.' 5
Part II examines the federal anti-kickback statute
jurisprudence and rules applicable to arrangements
between daily deal websites and health care
providers.' 6 Part III argues that while daily deal
websites do not actively market to beneficiaries of
Federal health care programs, the peculiarities of
this arrangement, such as the financial incentive
to increase the number of customers purchasing
coupons, support an inference of illegality under
the anti-kickback statute.17 Part III also posits
that regulatory safe harbors for personal services
and management contracts and for discounts do
not shield parties under this arrangement from
criminal prosecution because compensation under
this arrangement takes into account the volume of
generated business.'8 Part IV argues the discount
regulatory safe harbor should be amended to
encompass these arrangements because Congress
intended the safe harbors to evolve to reflect current
business practices.19 Lastly, this article concludes
that unless the regulatory safe harbors are amended
to encompass the daily deal website structure,
participants in these arrangements are at an increased
risk of liability under the anti-kickback statute.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Judicial Enforcement of the Anti-kickback
Statute and the Government's Burden of Proof
Congress enacted the anti-kickback statute to
deter the practice of providing remuneration as
an inducement to refer services reimbursable by
Federal health care programs.2 0 The anti-kickback
provision of the Social Security Act of 1972 prohibits
kickbacks, bribes, or rebates offered directly or
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in return for referring
individuals for items or services payable by Federal
health care programs. 21 Furthermore, referrals under
the statute include arranging for or recommending
purchasing, leasing, or ordering goods and services
for which payment may be made, in whole or in part,
by the federal government. 22 Such broad language
implicates even mundane business transactions in
the healthcare industry, and it applies to all federally
funded healthcare programs. 23 The impetus behind
the enactment of the anti-kickback statute is the
prevention of program abuse and fraudulent claims
and the protection of program beneficiaries. 24
In 1985, the Third Circuit held in United States
v. Greber that the federal anti-kickback statute
is violated so long as one purpose of a business
arrangement is to induce future referrals. 25 The "one-
purpose" doctrine judiciously broadened the scope
of the anti-kickback provision and is the standard
by which courts and the OIG analyze possible
violations.26 In addition, for a successful criminal
conviction under the statute the federal government
must prove that the defendant knowingly and willfully
intended to transfer prohibited remuneration. 27
Unlike the "one-purpose" doctrine - the majority
rule - courts were split on how the government must
prove the requisite intent.28 However, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 clarified
the mens rea requirement by expressly stating that
the defendant need not have actual knowledge or
specific intent to violate the statute. 29
In the same way, anti-kickback statute violations
ultimately depend on the totality of the
circumstances. 30 The government need not find
specific instances of fraud and abuse of Federal
health care programs to prosecute under the
statute. 31 The potential for abuse, coupled with
inadequate safeguards, makes practitioners and daily
deal websites vulnerable to prosecution. 32 Entities
involved in arrangements that do not adequately
satisfy the requirements of a regulatory safe harbor
are especially vulnerable.33
B. Regulatory Safe Harbor Exceptions to the
Anti-kickback Statute
The practice of discounting is statutorily exempt
from the anti-kickback statute only if discounts are
properly disclosed and reflected in reimbursement
claims submitted to Federal health care programs. 34
In addition, Congress authorized the OIG to issue
regulations specifying payment practices that
are protected from criminal and civil liability. 5
Accordingly, several legally sanctioned activities,
written in the Code of Federal Regulations, shield
an entity from both civil and criminal prosecution.36
However, failure to fall within one of the regulatory
68
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safe harbor exceptions does not automatically make
an arrangement unlawful; rather, the arrangement
is assessed under the statute for legality.37 The OIG
often issues advisory opinions on the applicability of
a particular safe harbor provision to a hypothetical
arrangement in cases where the legality of an
arrangement may be unclear.38
Of the twenty-five safe harbor exceptions, one of the
most important provisions to the daily deal business
arrangement is the discounts safe harbor provision. 39
For daily deal websites to fall within the discount
safe harbor, a claim submitted by a seller on behalf
of a buyer must show the discount was provided at
the time of service.40 Furthermore, the seller must
be able to show, upon request, that the offeror, which
is an entity that promotes the purchase of an item
or service, notified the seller of its obligations to
report such a discount.4 1 A medical provider who
submits a claim on behalf of a patient who bought a
coupon from a daily deal website must show that the
discount was made at the time of service and that the
daily deal website notified the seller of its obligation
to report the discount; otherwise, the safe harbor
provision does not apply.42
Furthermore, the safe harbor for personal services
and management contracts is relevant to daily deal
website arrangements.43 This safe harbor exempts
service contracts from anti-kickback scrutiny if they
fully comply with the seven requirements outlined
in the provision." These requirements include that
a business arrangement must serve a reasonable
commercial purpose and it must not be based on the
volume of business generated by the principal and
the agent. 45 An agent for purposes of the safe harbor
is any person other than a bona fide employee of the
principal.46
Like other provisions of the statute, the intent
behind a payment arrangement is controlling in
the determination of compliance with the discount
safe harbor.47 Thus, a profit motive alone may
be insufficient to prove intent to transfer illegal
remuneration.48 Yet there may be cases where a jury
can infer intent to induce referrals of beneficiaries of
Federal health care programs where the profit motive
is overwhelming. 49
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C. Business Arrangements that are Highly
Disfavored by the OIG Because of Their
Susceptibility to Abuse
The parties in Zimmer Inc. v. Nu Tech Medical,
Inc. agreed to a percentage-based compensation
agreement where a manufacturer of orthopedic
products, Zimmer, consigned products to a
supplier of medical items, Nu Tech.5o Nu Tech
would then distribute to physician offices and bill
Medicare."' Nu Tech would retain a percentage of
all reimbursements depending on the volume of
billable products.52 Zimmer sought an advisory
opinion when the parties began to differ on the
proper execution of the contract.53 Zimmer also filed
suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the contract
was unenforceable since it violated the anti-kickback
statute.54 This advisory opinion was fully considered
and incorporated by the District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana in its opinion.,5 it is
not unusual for a court to defer to the conclusions
of an advisory opinion in judicial proceedings when
analyzing possible violations of the anti-kickback
statute.5 6 Advisory opinion 98-01 was an analysis
of the proposed arrangement between Zimmer and
Nu Tech. 57 The Zimmer court adopted this opinion
to conclude that the proposed arrangement presented
significant financial incentives to increase marketing
and billing practices, that Nu Tech would unduly
influence referral sources and patients, and that
the arrangement contained insufficient safeguards
against fraud and abuse. 58
Nursing Home Consultants v. Quantum Health
Services exemplifies another case where percentage
compensation agreements have been found illegal
under the anti-kickback statute. 59 In Quantum
Health Services, Quantum, a medical equipment
supplier, and NHC, a marketer of medical supplies,
entered into a contract that obligated NHC to
identify Medicare recipients who needed medical
supplies and arrange for the recipients to purchase
supplies from Quantum.60 NHC's compensation
was tied to the number of units of medical supplies
Quantum sold, so the more Medicare business NHC
sent to Quantum, the greater NHC's compensation. 61
The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas found the underlying marketing
agreement illegal and unenforceable under the anti-
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kickback statute when NHC filed a breach of contract
claim.62 The court further held that the marketing
agreement was not shielded by the safe harbor for
personal services since compensation was based on
the number of sales NHC generated. 63
Lastly, the anti-kickback statute does not distinguish
between physicians and lay persons because either
party can refer, arrange for, or recommend federal
health care business.6 The court in United States v.
Polin, for instance, found this distinction a distortion
of the Act.65 In Polin, the medical director and
registered nurse of a cardiac monitoring facility were
charged with violating the anti-kickback statute when
they paid a pacemaker salesman to recommend their
services to beneficiaries of Medicare. 66 The court
found this to be a classic kickback scheme explicitly
prohibited by the statute.67
III. ANALYSIS
A. Arrangements Between Daily Deal Websites
and Providers of Medical Services Violates the
Anti-Kickback Statute Because They Present an
Increased Risk of Fraud and Abuse.
The potential for business arrangements between
daily deal websites and health care providers to
encourage overutilization of Federal health care
programs, and provision of medically unnecessary
care, poses an unacceptable risk of program abuse. 68
Moreover, certain aspects of the current arrangement
between these parties are not only potentially
abusive, but also violative of the anti-kickback
statute according to judicial and administrative
interpretations.
1. Percentage Compensation Arrangements Have
Been Disfavored by the Courts and the OIG
Because of the Potentialfor Overutilization and
the Financial Incentive to Increase Federal Health
Care Business.
Business arrangements that encourage
overutilization of services covered under Federal
health care programs, or that otherwise increase
program costs, pose an unacceptable risk of fraud
and abuse.69 In particular, the OIG has found
percentage compensation arrangements potentially
abusive because of the financial incentive to
increase services billable to Federal health care
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programs.70 Percentage compensation arrangements
are susceptible to abusive practices because of the
lack of safeguards against fraud and abuse, the
financial incentives to increase abusive marketing
practices, and the opportunity to unduly influence
referral sources and patients.71 Through specialized
marketing, the hallmark of daily deal websites, these
sites ensure a minimum threshold of customers for
the practitioner utilizing its services.72 In addition,
daily deal websites necessarily have an incentive
to exceed this threshold of customers to increase
their financial gain.73 This business arrangement
encourages overutilization of Federal health care
programs by incentivizing procurement of the
maximum number of customers, of which the federal
government is certain to pay for services rendered to
beneficiaries of the programs. 74
A pre-determined fee arrangement between these
parties would help refute the notion that daily deal
websites function as referral organizations or arrange
for the purchase of reimbursable services because the
underlying financial incentive to increase the supply
of patients would be mitigated.75 The OIG reached a
favorable decision in advisory opinion 12-02 partly
because the proposed arrangement established a set
fee that would be paid in advance, irrespective of the
volume of referrals.76 The requestor would charge a
flat monthly fee based on the level of a provider's
membership.7 7 In contrast, since compensation is
tied to the volume of business in the case of daily
deal websites, these arrangements pose an increased
risk of fraud and abuse.78 The OIG has maintained,
in discussions of other proposed arrangements, that
"per click," "per patient," and similar compensation
arrangements are highly disfavored under the anti-
kickback statute.79
Nevertheless, whether a profitable business
arrangement was entered into with the intent to
induce referrals of federally funded business is
usually a question for a jury."0 So long as the
benefits of a profitable business scheme passes to the
federal government, incentives to generate business
may not be particularly troublesome.81 Yet, in daily
deal arrangements it is not always the case that the
federal government reaps the benefits of a profitable
business scheme. For example, where a customer
buys a coupon for year-long membership in a
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medical group, not every service billable to Federal
health care programs will be discounted because the
discount applies to membership fees and not health
services. 82
2. Daily Deal Websites Violate the Anti-Kickback
Statute by Referring Patients to Practitioners
andArranging for or Recommending Services
Reimbursable by Federal Health Care Programs.
Although it is left to a jury to decide whether the
parties to an arrangement had the requisite intent to
commit fraud, the substantive agreement between
daily deal websites and providers of medical services
alone is indicative of an intent to induce referrals
of federally funded business.83 As the court held
in Zimmer, the four corners of the contract, when
unambiguous, are an expression of the intent of
the parties to the contract. 84 Since providers enter
arrangements with daily deal websites to promote
their business and to ultimately retain customers
for the long term, a provider's retention of new
customers using daily deal websites supports an
inference of illegal conduct.85
The anti-kickback statute prohibits knowingly and
willfully paying, offering, soliciting or receiving
remuneration in return for referring an individual or
arranging for any service for which payment may be
made in part under a Federal health care program.86
Daily deal websites receive as compensation
a percentage of all medical service coupons
customers purchase, and in turn practitioners gain
new patients.87 Alternatively, practitioners are also
offering remuneration for arranging for service
for which payment may be made in whole or in
part under a Federal health care program." This
qualifies as illegal remuneration as defined in the
anti-kickback statute because where a practitioner
shares profits amassed from advertising discounted
medical services in exchange for new patients who
will likely stay long term, a valuable exchange
takes place. Daily deal websites essentially operate
as referral organizations under such arrangements;
thus, a reasonable interpretation of the agreement
between these parties will support an inference of
illegal conduct or the potential for an exchange of
prohibited remuneration. 89
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As in Quantum, daily deal websites arrange for or
recommend the purchase of services reimbursable
by Federal health care programs.90 For example, in a
deal for discounted membership in a medical group
offering primary care and lab services covered by
Medicare, one could easily conclude that the daily
deal website is arranging for or recommending
the purchase of services billable to Federal health
care programs. 91 The court in Quantum found that
a marketing company violated the anti-kickback
statute by recommending to Medicare recipients that
they purchase their supplies from a supplier that paid
the marketing company a percentage of all products
sold.92 In the aforementioned example, the daily deal
website essentially recommended the purchase of
services from a medical group when it marketed the
discounted membership to thousands of its members
in exchange for a percentage of all coupons sold.93
3. Daily Deal Websites Do Not Actively Market to
Beneficiaries of Federal Health Care Programs;
However These Sites Exert Influence over Referral
Sources by Way of Their Popularity in the Market.
The opportunity for a marketer to unduly influence
referral sources and patients is a significant factor
in evaluating whether a particular arrangement is
in violation of the anti-kickback statute. 94 While
daily deal websites do receive remuneration and
practitioners offer remuneration for services billable
to Federal health care programs, daily deal websites
arguably influence beneficiaries and practitioners to
purchase and post coupons for medical services.95
In Polin, the unfettered recommendations of a
pacemaker sales representative to use the appellees'
cardiac monitoring service were held sufficient
to substantiate a kickback charge against the
appellee. 96 Unlike the sales representative in Polin,
however, daily deal websites do not market directly
or solely to beneficiaries of Federal health care
programs.97 Active marketing and direct contact with
beneficiaries present opportunities to improperly
influence referral sources. 98
Daily deal websites do not engage in what the OIG
refers to as "white coat marketing."99 White coat
marketing, or marketing activities engaged in by
health care professionals, is subject to closer scrutiny
because health care professionals are in a special
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position of trust.10 Like the requestor of advisory
opinion 12-02, daily deal websites are non-health
care entities that market coupons. Moreover, in this
case it is more favorable that daily deal websites offer
coupons for a variety of goods and services, not just
those from health care entities.' This further shows
that daily deal websites are not health care entities
or affiliated solely with the health care industry.
Additionally, daily deal websites market coupons
to the general population irrespective of whether or
not a customer has a particular health insurance. 102
Their marketing practices do not raise the usual red
flags found in marketing schemes discussed in OIG
advisory opinions. 0 3
However, this arrangement steers patients to
particular providers because advertising on daily
deal websites is not akin to advertising on other
public websites or print media.'04 While customers
are the ultimate decision makers on whether or not
to purchase coupons for a medical service, daily
deal websites control the prominence of the deal on
its website and the frequency of targeted emails it
sends to thousands on its listserve.os As discussed
in advisory opinion 12-02, advertising activity that
is simply displayed on a website and not targeted
to the customer using the site presents a low risk of
fraud and abuse because it is not meant to induce
the purchase of a practitioner's coupon.106 In that
opinion, the OIG noted that patients would not
perceive coupons to be an endorsement of any
particular health care provider other than the provider
advertising its business.107 However, in the case of
daily deal websites, targeted advertising activity to
frequent users of its website presents an increased
risk of program abuse. 08
The risk of program abuse when daily deal websites
influence beneficiaries' choice in medical services
is further compounded when beneficiaries receive
unnecessary medical service.109 Pre-paid coupons
for medical services may improperly influence a
provider's medical judgment to render medically
unnecessary or inappropriate services. 10 The
proposed arrangement in advisory opinion 12-
02 presented a decreased risk of abuse because
customers would not pre-pay for coupons, thus
alleviating the pressure on practitioners to provide
medically unnecessary services.'l This is not
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the case in current arrangements with daily deal
websites because customers pay up front for the
coupon, and consequently have an expectation
to receive applicable services, regardless of the
necessity of such services. 112 Practitioners, well
aware of this expectation, will likely feel pressured
to provide a service even when it is not appropriate
to do so. To the extent this is directed toward Federal
health care program beneficiaries, this may be an
abusive practice, encouraging overutilization of
these programs."13
B. Regulatory Safe Harbors Are Inapplicable
to Daily Deal Websites as Currently Structured
Because These Arrangements Do Not Meet All
the Requirements of Relevant Safe Harbors.
Business arrangements between daily deal websites
and practitioners have the potential to violate the
anti-kickback statute; however, participants in this
arrangement can shield themselves from liability
by structuring the arrangement to fully comply with
a regulatory safe harbor." 4 Of course, since non-
compliance with a safe harbor is not a requisite
element of establishing an AKS violation, it is
important to note that the inquiry into whether a
defendant's conduct falls within a regulatory safe
harbor is reserved for trial." 5 Instead, the government
must also prove that the defendant knowingly and
willfully intended wrongful conduct.116 The safe
harbor for personal services and management
contracts and the safe harbor for discounts are
the most applicable to this arrangement.' Yet the
parties in these arrangements, as currently structured,
will not be shielded from criminal penalties and
civil sanctions under the anti-kickback statute.118
1. The Safe Harbor for Personal Services and
Management Contracts Is Inapplicable to the Daily
Deal Website Arrangement Since This Arrangement
Takes into Account the Volume ofBusiness
Generated.
Under the personal services and management
contract safe harbor, a practitioner functions as the
principle within the meaning of the regulation." 9
Accordingly, daily deal websites function as the
agent of the principle since it is not a bona fide
employee of the health organization.120 Five of
the seven requirements set out in this safe harbor
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are dispositive upon a cursory assessment of the
arrangement. Presumably, the arrangement between
daily deal websites and practitioners are set out in
writing and signed by the parties. 121 The written
instrument likely details the specific services daily
deal websites will provide to practitioners, and
the agreement also specifies the duration of the
arrangement. 12 2 Lastly, services under the contract
can be deemed reasonably necessary to accomplish
commercially reasonable business purposes. 123
However, the arrangement fails to meet two of the
seven standards outlined in the regulation.124 The
first failure concerns part five of the regulation;
daily deal websites do not receive compensation
in advance of the launch of the coupon. 125 As the
Zimmer court held, it is unreasonable to interpret a
percentage compensation agreement as payment for
services rendered.126 Here, daily deal websites are
paid a percentage of all coupons sold; therefore, the
aggregate compensation is not set out in advance as
required by the regulation.127 In advisory opinion
99-12, where company A would print and distribute
coupons from retailers involved in the delivery
of health care items or services, the OIG found it
central to its analysis that compensation was not
conditioned on the actual use of the coupon on a
reimbursable item or service. 128 Also, in the case of
daily deal websites, compensation is not dependent
on customers actually obtaining services billable
to the federal government. But unlike the proposed
arrangement in advisory opinion 99-12, daily deal
websites are not paid a set fee prior to displaying
the coupons, a favorable factor contributing to the
sanction of the proposed arrangement.129
This arrangement also fails to meet another prong
of part five of the safe harbor, which requires that
compensation should not take into account the
volume of business generated between the parties.130
Compensation of daily deal websites is tied to the
volume of business generated by coupons displayed
on behalf of practitioners, and Federal health care
programs pay (in whole or in part) for a portion of
business generated from these coupons.'3 1 Zimmer
held that by virtue of including a percentage
compensation scheme in the contract, the court was
justified in concluding that the parties intended to
increase the sale of products billable to Medicare. 32
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The agreement between the parties in this instance
can similarly be held illegal and unenforceable
because it could evince intention to increase services
billable to Federal health care programs.133
2. The Discount Safe Harbor Provision Is
Inapplicable to the Daily Deal Website Arrangement
Because Proper Disclosures and Notifications Are
Not Made.
Practitioners and daily deal websites must meet the
requirements for "seller" and "offeror," as outlined
in the discount safe harbor in order to shield
themselves from criminal and civil sanctions.134
Under the discount safe harbor, practitioners that
submit a claim on behalf of a customer must
provide, upon request, information that shows that
the daily deal website gave notice, "in manner
reasonably calculated to give notice," to the
practitioner of its duty to report the discount.135 For
daily deal websites to meet the requirements of the
discount safe harbor, it must simply give notice to
practitioners, "in a manner reasonably calculated to
give notice," of its obligation to report discounts.136
Although these requirements are straightforward, it
is unclear whether they are included in the current
practices of daily deal websites.137 The requestor of
advisory opinion 12-02 received a favorable opinion
because the requestor certified that it would satisfy
its obligation to notify sellers and buyers of their
duty to report discounts through the Terms of Use
on its website.' 38 Daily deal websites must notify
customers purchasing coupons for medical services
as well as practitioners using its service of this duty
to report; otherwise, a discount safe harbor defense
is precluded.'3I
Daily deal websites do not have sufficient safeguards
to ensure that discounts pass to the federal
government since. For example, a patient enrolled
in a medical group under discounted membership
fees from a daily deal website promotion will
not receive perpetually discounted health care
services.'4 0 Rather, the discount will only apply to
the patient's cost-sharing obligations, not the entire
service.141 Sufficient safeguards to mitigate the risk
of overutilization of Federal health care programs
are partly why the proposed arrangement reached a
favorable result in advisory opinion 12-02.142 In this
73
proposed arrangement, the requestor also certified
that through its Terms of Use it would inform
practitioners and customers utilizing its services that
discounts must apply to the entire item or service,
not just the customer's cost-sharing obligation.143
In other words, the requestor certified it would
comply with the discount safe harbor, which daily
deal websites fail to do since discounts apply to the
customer's cost-sharing obligation. '
Moreover, there is potential for providers to engage in
abusive billing practices because there are inadequate
safeguards in place to prevent these practices.145
Although customers first have to purchase coupons
for medical services and then redeem those coupons
before any potentially fraudulent or abusive billing
practices can take place, it is irrelevant to the anti-
kickback inquiry whether increased cost to the
federal government is actually realized.' 6
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Although the business arrangement between
practitioners and daily deal websites is illegal
under the anti-kickback statute and unprotected by
a statutory or regulatory safe harbor, the discount
safe harbor should be amended to offer protection
to this kind of arrangement.147 As is, the safe harbor
for discounts is not intended to protect arrangements
between practitioners and daily deal websites
because daily deal websites are not an offeror within
the meaning of the safe harbor.148 An offeror must
be the entity that provides a discount on an item or
service to a buyer.149 Since daily deal websites do
not provide the discounts but instead market them to
their customers, they are technically not within the
purview of the safe harbor.150
However, Congress intended the regulatory safe
harbors to evolve to reflect current business
practices.'51 Evolving safe harbors ensure that the
health care industry can take advantage of innovative
discount practices so that savings may be passed on
to the federal government.152 Certain deals currently
on the market fail to have the necessary safeguards
in place to ensure discounts pass to the federal
government. 5 Specifically, deals only applying to
the customer's cost sharing obligation under Federal
health care programs and not to the entire item or
service billable to the federal government raise
74
significant concern.154 Amending the discount safe
harbor can provide some guidance to practitioners
and daily deal websites on how to structure a deal to
meet this end.15 s
V. CONCLUSION
Medical services coupons advertised on daily deal
websites violate the anti-kickback statute because
practitioners essentially offer remuneration for
referrals from these websites.' 56 The favorable
opinion issued by the OIG on a similar arrangement
presented a low risk of fraud and abuse because it did
not encompass a percentage compensation structure
and did not create financial incentives to over-utilize
Federal health care programs.157 In contrast, through
targeted advertising activity, daily deal websites
may arrange for the purchase of services billable to
Federal health care programs.'15 Furthermore, this
business arrangement encourages overutilization
of Federal health care programs because daily deal
websites have an incentive to increase the amount of
customers purchasing coupons for medical services,
since it will receive a percentage of all coupons
sold.15 9 Because the safe harbor provisions for
personal services and management contracts and
for discounts do not apply to these arrangements,
practitioners and these websites are vulnerable to
prosecution under the anti-kickback statute. 160 TO
enable compliance with the statute by practitioners
and daily deal proprietors, the discount safe harbor
should be amended to reflect current business
practices so discounted health care items and
services may be passed to the federal government.161
Amending the statute is consistent with what
Congress intended when it enacted the discount
exception to the anti-kickback statute. 162
See Valerie Barba DDS Deal of the Day, GRouroN, http://
www.groupon.com/deals/valerie-barba-dds-central-jersey
(last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (advertising dental services from
a practitioner in New Jersey).
2 See FAQ, GROUPON, http://www.groupon.com/faq#3
(last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (stating if not enough persons
purchase a deal, it is cancelled and customer will not be
charged).
3 See id. (claiming the customers are not required to sign up
groups of people for the deal to take effect since Groupon
consists of millions of members).
' See Why Groupon Works for Business, GROUPON WORKS,
http://www.grouponworks.com/why-groupon (last visited
Feb. 27, 2013) (citing a survey that found ninety-one
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percent of customers have returned or plan to return to the
merchant).
5 See, e.g., LIVING SoCIAL, http://livingsocial.com/cities/1-
washington-d-c (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (daily deal
website based in Washington, D.C.); MAN DEALS, http://
mandeals.com/index.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (daily
deal website catering to men).
6 See. e.g., The Best Deals in Georgetown/Foggy Bottom-
One Medical Group-Annual Membership, LIVING SocIAL,
http://www.livingsocial.com/cities/ 1171-georgetown-
foggy-bottom/deals/391530-annual-membership?show
missed=true (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) [hereinafter LIVING
SOCIAL] (advertising discounted membership to a medical
group offering primary care services).
See Office of Inspector General I U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, https://oig.hhs.gov/about-oig/
about-us/index.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (comprising
of six departments, including the Office of Counsel to the
Inspector General-which renders advisory opinions on
issues that may implicate the Anti-kickback statute).
See Op. Dep't Health & Human Servs. Office of Insp.
Gen. 12-02 at I (Mar. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Advisory
Opinion 12-02], available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
advisoryopinions
/2012/AdvOpn I 2-02.pdf (analyzing whether the proposed
arrangement would result in exclusion from federal health
care programs or imposition of civil monetary penalties for
violating the anti-kickback statute).
9 See id. at 2 (stating the proprietor of the website would
contract with physicians and other health care providers
who wish to participate in one of five membership levels
offering varying degrees of promotion and coupon display).
10 See id. at 5 (stating customers would not be required to
create an account to access the coupons).
I I See id. (proposing that customers submitting their own
claims to federal health care programs will be advised to
report any discounts from use of a coupon).
12 See id. at 10-11 (concluding the proposed arrangement
could potentially generate prohibited remuneration if the
parties had the requisite intent to induce or reward federal
health care business; however, the OIG would not impose
administrative sanctions because of the low risk of abuse).
13 See generally Social Security Act of 1972 §§ Il28A(a)
(7)7 1128B(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a(a)(7), 1320a-7b(b)
(2006) (enacting criminal and civil monetary penalties for
prohibited acts involving federal health care programs).
14 Contra Advisory Opinion 12-02, supra note 9 at 8
(finding proposed arrangement low risk under the anti-
kickback statute because coupons are equivalent to print
advertisements and are not targeted to particular customers).
5 See OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions Response to
Comments and Summary of Revisions, 56 Fed. Reg.
35,952, 35,954 (July 29, 1991) (codified at 42 C.ER. pt.
1001) (stating participation in an arrangement structured in
compliance with a regulatory safe harbor provision shields a
person from criminal or civil prosecution).
16 See infra Part II (discussing the nuances of anti-kickback
case law and interpretation of regulatory safe harbors).
7 See infra Part III(A) (arguing percentage compensation
agreements inherently incentivize overutilization of federal
health care programs).
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It See infra Part Ill(B) (analyzing the arrangement between
daily deal websites and practitioners under the personal
services and management contracts safe harbor, and the
discount safe harbor).
19 See infra Part IV (proposing safe harbors should be
amended so the health care industry can take advantage of
innovative discount practices which would pass saving to
the federal government).
20 See generally John A. Bourdeau, Annotation, Illegal
Remuneration Under Medicare Anti-kickback Statute
(Social Security Act § 1128B) (42 US. CA. §§ 1320a-7b),
132 A.L.R. Fed. 601 (1996).
21 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (2006) (prohibiting acts
that increase the likelihood of fraud and abuse of federal
health care programs).
22 See, e.g., Dep't Health & Human Servs. Office of Insp.
Gen. Op. 98-01 at 8 (Mar. 19, 1998) [hereinafter Advisory
Opinion 98-01], available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
advisoryopinions/1998/ao98_1.pdf (declining to give a
favorable opinion where a company would market and bill
Medicare on behalf of a medical supply company).
23 See DAVID E. MATYAS & CARRIE VALIANT, LEGAL
ISSUES IN HEALTHCARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: NAVIGATING THE
UNCERTAINTIES 17 (3d ed. 2006) (opining that the Anti-
kickback statute will remain a focus of the health care
industry because its reach is expanding).
24 See United States v. Bay State Ambulance Serv., Inc.,
874 F.2d 20, 29 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating inducement of
Medicare business is the essence of the Medicare fraud);
see also United States v. Greber, 760 E2d 68, 71 (3d Cir.
1985) (recognizing the purpose of the Anti-kickback statute
is to combat financial incentives for physicians to order
medically unnecessary services).
25 See Greber, 760 E2d at 69 (affirming jury instructions
stating defendant is guilty if a purpose of the arrangement
was to induce further orders of services).
26 E.g., United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 835
(10th Cir. 2000) (adopting the "one-purpose" test as the
correct interpretation of the statute); United States v. Kats,
871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding Greber court's
interpretation of the Anti-kickback statute consistent with
legislative history).
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006) (prohibiting
remunerations to induce referrals of beneficiaries of Federal
health care programs); Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51
F.3d 1390, 1398 (9th Cir. 1995) (outlining standard of proof
as an intent to exert undue influence over the reason or
judgment of another to produce referrals).
28 Compare United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491,
495-96 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (finding the knowingly and
willfully standard does not require knowledge of illegality
of defendant's conduct), with Hanlester Network, 51 F.3d
at 1400 (reasoning violation of the anti-kickback statute
requires specific intent to violate the statute).
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h) (2011) (imposing a
maximum fine of $25,000, imprisonment up to five years,
or both, and automatic exclusion from Federal health care
programs under a general intent standard).
30 See United States v. Shaw, 106 F. Supp. 2d 103, 115
(D. Mass. 2000) (explaining the statute penalizes conduct
that crosses the line from permitted price competition to
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impermissible discounting especially where savings do not
pass to Federal health care programs).
' See United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 (7th
Cir. 1980) (holding a determination of direct and immediate
costs to the Medicare-Medicaid system irrelevant to
conviction under the statute because the government
punishes the potential for increased costs).
32 See Issuance of Advisory Opinions by OIG, 62 Fed.
Reg. 7,350, 7,351 (Feb. 19, 1997) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
Part 1008) (stating application of safe harbor is appropriate
where an arrangement contains limitations, requirements,
or controls that adequately ensure that Federal health care
programs cannot be abused).
3 See OG Anti-kickback Provisions Response to
Comments and Summary of Revisions, 56 Fed. Reg.
35,952, 35,954 (July, 29 1991) (codified at 42 C.FR. Part
1001) (rejecting suggestions to protect arrangements that
substantially comply with safe harbors, or de minimis
violations of the statute).
1 See Shaw, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 111 (explaining discount
provision of anti-kickback statute was Congress's way of
ensuring normal discounting in business would remain
legal).
3s See id. at 112 (discussing the enactment of paragraph (e)
of the anti-kickback statute, which authorizes the Secretary
of the Department of Health and Human Services to
promulgate regulations exempting payment practices from
prosecution).
6 See 42 C.F.R § 1001.952 (2011) (codifying twenty-five
exceptions to anti-kickback statute).
37 See Response to Comments and Summary Revisions, 61
Fed. Reg. 2,122, 2,124 (Jan. 25, 1996) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
Part 1001) (advising commenters not to infer illegality of an
arrangement when safe harbor provisions are inapplicable to
an arrangement).
38 See, e.g., Dep't Health & Human Servs. Office of Insp.
Gen. Op. 08-19 (Nov. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Advisory
Opinion 08-19], available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
advisoryopinions/
2008/AdvOpnO8-19.pdf (analyzing a proposal to extend an
internet pay per lead advertising service to the chiropractic
industry); Dep't Health & Human Servs. Office of Insp.
Gen. Op. 99-12 (Dec. 6, 1999) [hereinafter Advisory
Opinion 99-12] available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
advisoryopinions/1999/ao99 12.htm (analyzing a coupon
distribution program utilizing physician practices and
clinics to distribute non-health care coupons).
' See 42 C.F.R § 1001.952(h) (2011) (dividing parties to
a discount arrangement into buyers, sellers, and offerors
of discounts). See generallv Michael K. Loucks & Carol
C. Lam, PROSECUTING AND DEFENDING HEALTH CARE FRAuD
CASEs 269 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining proper interpretation
of the regulatory safe harbors should be informed by the
statutory safe harbor).
40 See Clarification of Safe Harbor Provisions and
Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions, 64 Fed.
Reg. 63,518, 63,527 (Nov. 19, 1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
part 1001) (requiring the seller to fully and accurately report
discounted claims to the appropriate federal health care
program).
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41 See id. at 63,527 (stating that the offeror is protected
irrespective of the buyer or seller's failure to report the
discount if the offeror has done everything that it reasonably
could under the circumstances).
42 See United States v. Shaw, 106 F Supp. 2d 103, 119
(D. Mass. 2000) (holding that the jury must determine
whether disclosures are proper and appropriate to satisfy the
discount provision).
43 See 42 C.F.R § 1001.952(d) (2011) (exempting from the
illegal remuneration provision of the anti-kickback statute
payments made as compensation for services).
4 See id. (requiring a written agreement for not less than
one year, signed by the parties to the agreement).
45 See 64 Fed. Reg. at 63,525 (clarifying that the test is
not lawfulness under the statute but rather whether the
arrangement is reasonably calculated to further the business
of the purchaser).
46 See OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions Response to
Comments and Summary of Revisions, 56 Fed. Reg.
35,952, 35,974 (Jul. 29, 1991) (agreeing that advertising
activities fall under the safe harbor when such activities do
not involve direct contact with program beneficiaries or the
entities are not involved in health care delivery).
47 See Shaw, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 114 (declaring that a trier
of fact must determine an intent to commit a violation from
the substance of the transaction rather than the form or label
attached to the transaction).
48 See id. at 119 (stating that providers are encouraged to
seek discounts as good business practices so long as federal
or state health care programs share in the benefit of the
discount).
49 See id. at 121 (cautioning that while a jury can infer
that the purpose behind a particular business arrangement
was to induce federally funded business, the jury should
also understand that good business practices that increase
profits should not preclude immunity under the discount
exception); see also Zimmer v. Nu Tech Med., 54 F. Supp.
2d 850, 862 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (holding that a percentage-
based compensation scheme was sufficient to conclude
the parties were motivated to increase the sale of products
reimbursable by federal or state health care programs).
so See Zinimer 54 E Supp. 2d at 851-52 (noting that the
parties intended their business relationship to be that of
a supplier and an independent contractor responsible for
distribution and billing).
51 Id.
12 See id. at 852 (explaining that Nu Tech would retain
twenty to twenty-five percent of the dollar volume
receivable per year).
5 See id. (seeking an advisory opinion pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)).
54 See id. at 853 (arguing that the agreement was void and
unenforceable under Indiana law since it was illegal under
federal law).
5s See id. at 856 (stating that although an advisory opinion
is not mandatory authority, considerable weight should be
given to its conclusions).
56 See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 106 F. Supp. 2d 103, 113
(D. Mass. 2000) (rejecting the notion that OG statements
regarding its regulations are controlling but also expressing
the wisdom in considering the OIG's interpretation
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of key terms since it is the agency charged with its
implementation).
* Advisory Opinion 98-01, supra note 22.
58 See Zimnie; 54 F. Supp. 2d at 861 (finding that the
parties intended to enter into a percentage compensation
agreement, thereby violating the anti-kickback statute);
see also United States v. Miles, 360 F.3d 472, 480 (5th Cir.
2004) (finding a PR agency did not violate the anti-kickback
statutebecause the agency had no influence on a physician's
decision to use a particular home health care service).
5 See Nursing Home Consultants v. Quantum Health
Servs., 926 E Supp. 835, 841 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (analyzing
a marketing agreement for legality under the anti-kickback
statute).
60 See id. at 839 (noting that NHC was not involved in the
actual sale of medical supplies).
61 See id. (stating that the marketing agreement was for one
year and would automatically renew for an additional one-
year period unless either party was notified of cancellation).
62 See id. at 842 (reasoning that by virtue of its
compensation scheme, the marketing agreement is the sort
of business arrangement prohibited by the anti-kickback
statute).
63 See id. at 844 (declining to extend protection to the
marketing agreement since the safe harbor specifically
prohibits compensation schemes which take into account
the volume of referrals or business).
64 See, e.g., United States v. Polin, 194 F.3d 863, 866-67
(7th Cir. 1999) (ruling that providing payment in return for
directing Medicare patients to a cardiac monitoring service
violates the anti-kickback statute regardless of whether or
not payments were paid to a physician).
65 See id. at 867 (rejecting the assertion that the different
subsections of the anti-kickback statute address different
and non-overlapping schemes).
66 See id. at 865 (explaining that the defendants offered
a cardiac salesman $50 for each Medicare patient he
referred).
67 See id. at 866 (rejecting defendants' argument that they
did not violate the anti-kickback statute since their agent
was not a physician and only physicians could refer a
patient under the statute).
68 See Advisory Opinion 98-01, supra note 22 (discussing
the potential for abuse leading to increased program
costs where compensation incentivizes overutilization of
services).
69 Id
70 See id. (analyzing an arrangement where, under contract,
Company B would market services and goods to physicians,
submit claims of purchases to insurance carriers distributing
Medicare and Medicaid funds, and forward reimbursements
(less Company B's fee of twenty to twenty-five percent of
collected revenues) to Company A).
71 Id. at 6.
72 See Bari Weiss, Groupon's $6 Billion Gambler, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 20, 2010, available at online.
wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704828104576021481
410635432.html (stating that Groupon markets in over 375
American cities and thirty-five countries).
73 See, e.g., Zimmer v. Nu Tech Med., 54 E Supp. 2d
850, 857-58 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (discussing examples of
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percentage compensation schemes struck down by courts
because one party was in a position to control the supply of
persons or services to its benefit).
74 See id. at 862 (holding that the parties' agreement
involved prohibited remuneration because products
might be paid for in full or in part by Federal health care
programs).
7 See Nursing Home Consultants v. Quantum Health
Servs., 926 E Supp. 835, 841 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (finding
that a marketing agreement where compensation is tied to a
pre-determined annual fee would be legal and distinct from
the agreement in question, which tied compensation to the
number of sales made by the defendant).
See Advisory Opinion 12-02, supra note 8, at 4.
n See id.
78 See Advisory Opinion 99-12, supra note 38.
79 Id.
so See United States v. Shaw, 106 F Supp. 2d 103, 121
(D. Mass. 2000) (stating that whether the discount or other
reduction in price was passed to the federal government can
suggest the requisite intent of the parties).
8 See id. at 111 (discussing Congress's intention to
encourage good business practices which may result in
savings to Federal health care programs).
82 See LIVING SOCIAL, supra note 6 (limiting a coupon for
discounted membership in a medical group to one per
person per visit).
83 See id. (establishing that the reason behind a transaction
and the requisite state of mind are more substantial than the
form of the transaction).
84 See Zimmer v. Nu Tech Med., 54 E Supp. 2d. 850, 859
(N.D. Ind. 1999) (applying fundamental contract principles
to determine intent to engage in prohibited conduct under
the anti-kickback statute).
85 See Shaw, 106 F. Supp. 2d. at 121 (permitting a jury to
use a strong profit motive to infer willfully and knowingly
acting to induce referrals of federal health care business).
But see United States v. McClatchy, 217 E3d 823, 834
(10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that an expectation or hope
that referrals may ensue from legitimate services is not a
violation of the AKS).
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006) (stating that
prohibited remuneration includes kickbacks, bribes, or
rebates).
87 See Weiss, supra note 71 (explaining that Groupon
obtains roughly fifty percent of the coupon revenue).
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006) (including
remuneration offered directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly).
89 See Zinner, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 853-54 (N.D. Ind.
1999) (rejecting defendant's alternate interpretation of
a percentage-based supplier-distributer agreement as an
unreasonable interpretation); see also United States v.
Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1980) (concluding
that the potential for increased costs is the evil Congress
sought to avoid).
90 See Nursing Home Consultants v. Quantum Health
Servs., 926 E Supp. 835, 843 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (finding the
arrangement in violation of subparagraph B of the anti-
kickback statute because the medical equipment supplier
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was paid for recommending to Medicare recipients that they
purchase supplies from its business partner).
91 See LIVING SOCIAL, supra note 6 (advertising One
Medical Group, a medical office offering primary
care services and on-site lab services in the District of
Columbia).
92 See Quantum Health Servs., 926 E Supp. at 839 (noting
that the compensation scheme in the marketing agreement
fell within the class of transactional relationships prohibited
by the anti-kickback statute).
9 See LIVING SOCIAL, supra note 6 (advertising annual
membership for $99, a fifty percent savings).
94 See Zimmer, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 855 (deferring to OIG
advisory opinion 98-01 which found that the percentage
compensation arrangement between the parties presented
opportunities for both parties to unduly influence referral
sources by marketing actively, and directly to Medicare
patients).
15 See United States v. Miles, 360 E3d 472, 480 (5th
Cir. 2004) (finding that the company, by engaging in
promotional activities on behalf of the appellants, did not
unduly influence physicians who were the subject of the
promotional activities).
96 See United States v. Polin, 194 F.3d 863, 866 (7th Cir.
1999) (rebutting appellee's argument that because physician
approval was ultimately needed before a patient could use
its services, only a physician was capable of making a
referral).
97 See Partner with Living Social, LIVING SOCIAL, https://
getfeatured.livingsocial.com/getfeatured/us (last visited
Aug. 20, 2012) (suggesting targeted marketing to
trendsetters, families and food lovers to reach valuable new
customers).
98 See Advisory Opinion 98-01, supra note 22 (analyzing
proposed arrangement to find Company B would have
opportunities to influence referral sources because
Company B markets, consults and bills in connection with
home medical equipment).
9 See Advisory Opinion 08-19, supra note 38.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See Advisory Opinion 99-12, supra note 38 (evaluating
the totality of the circumstances, including distribution
to all patients regardless of health insurance coverage, to
conclude proposed arrangement does not implicate the anti-
kickback statute).
103 See, e.g., id. (sanctioning a proposed arrangement
because, among other things, coupons were distributed to all
patients, irrespective of their insurance coverage); Advisory
Opinion 08-19, supra note 38 (finding significant that all
potential customers will receive the same automated service
in an arrangement where advertising activity would extend
to the chiropractic industry).
0 See Advisory Opinion 12-02, supra note 8 at 8 (stating
that accurate and non-deceptive print advertising does not
raise anti-kickback concerns).
105 See Roadmap and Timeline for Merchants Groupon
Works, GROUPON WORKS, http://www.grouponworks.com/
merchant-services/groupon-roadmap (last visited Aug. 20,
2012) (touting emails to thousands of subscribers while
targeting likely new customers of the advertiser).
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106 See Advisory Opinion 12-02, supra note at 9.
107 Id.
1os See Partner with Living Social, LIVING SOCIAL, https://
getfeatured.livingsocial.com/getfeatured/us (last visited
Aug. 20, 2012) (claiming its members are looking for a
reason to try new things).
109 See Advisory Opinion 12-02, supra note 8, at 8.
110 Id.
III See id. (likening coupons in the proposed arrangement
to those mailed to consumers since there is no up-front
investment by consumers).
112 See Terms and Condition, LIVING SOCIAL, http://
livingsocial.com
/terms#certainconditions_placed on-your use of the..
site and services (last visited Aug. 07, 2012) (requiring
customers to redeem coupons in its entirety in one visit
since promotional value of the deal is time sensitive).
113 See Advisory Opinion 98-01, supra note 22, at 6
(finding that the potential for overutilization of items and
services poses an unacceptable risk of fraud and abuse).
114 See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h) (2011) (outlining
requisite elements in an arrangement to shield entities from
criminal and civil prosecution under the anti-kickback
statute).
115 See United States v. Shaw, 106 F Supp. 2d 103, 122 (D.
Mass. 2000) (rejecting defendant's argument that his motion
to dismiss should prevail because the alleged wrongdoing is
protected under the discount exception).
116 See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding specific intent is not the requisite
mens rea under the anti-kickback statute).
"' See generally 42 CFR. § 1001.952 (promulgating
permissive exclusions based on anti-kickback statute
violations).
"' See OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions Response to
Comments and Summary of Revisions, 56 Fed. Reg.
35,952, 35,954 (July, 29 1991) (codified at 42 C.ER.
Part 1001) (stating that arrangements which do not fully
comply with a regulatory safe harbor are not protected from
criminal and civil sanctions).
"' See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (defining the principle
as the individual making payments as compensation for
services performed).
120 See id. (explaining that the agent is shielded from
liability so long as all the seven standards are met).
121 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)(1) (requiring a written
instrument signed by both parties).
122 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)(2)-(4) (declaring that the
agreement must specify an exact schedule of intervals,
precise length, and exact charge for periodic or sporadic
services provided by the agent but that the term of the
agreement must not be less than a year).
123 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)(7) (requiring that the
aggregate services be commercially reasonable).
124 See Nursing Home Consultants v. Quantum Health
Servs., 926 F. Supp. 835, 842 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (declaring
a marketing agreement unenforceable because the parties
failed to set payment in a manner that did not take into
account the volume of business).
125 See Partner with LivingSocial, LIVING SOCIAL, https://
getfeatured.livingsocial.com/getfeatured/us (last visited
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Aug. 20, 2012) (noting no upfront cost to practitioners when
running a promotion).
126 See Zimmer v. Nu Tech Medical, 54 F Supp. 2d 850,
861 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (using defendant's fee schedule, which
outlined the percentage of billable services due per year, to
conclude that the defendant's fee was not for goods sold).
127 See Quantum, 926 F. Supp. at 844 (noting that failure
to satisfy this provision of the safe harbor makes the
agreement illegal, regardless of whether it was a technical
violation of the statute).
128 See Advisory Opinion 99-12, supra note 38 (indicating
it may have reached a different conclusion had coupons tied
directly or indirectly to a service reimbursable by Federal
health care programs).
129 See id (specifying that the clinics in the proposed
arrangement would be compensated before coupon
distribution).
13o See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)(5) (2011) (requiring
aggregate compensation to be consistent with fair market
value in arms-length transactions).
131 See Advisory Opinion 98-01, supra note 22 (discussing
the potential for abuse leading to increased program
costs where compensation incentivizes overutilization of
services).
132 See Zimmer, 54 F. Supp. at 861 (N.D. Ind. 1999)
(finding irrelevant to the analysis of legality whether a
particular party was responsible for the actual marketing of
products).
133 See id. at 863 (declining to sever Federal health care
programs from the agreement because it would re-write the
contract).
131 See generally 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h)(5) (2011)
(defining discount as a "reduction in the amount charged for
an item or service based on an arms-length transaction").
35 See id. at § 100 1.952(h)(2) (stating that discounts must
be reflected in the claims customers submit on their own
behalf).
136 See id. at § 1001.952(h) (outlining standards to shield
entities from criminal and civil prosecution under the anti-
kickback statute).
137 See, e.g., LIVING SOCIAL, supra note 6 (neglecting to
state disclosures in fine print or terms of use).
138 See Advisory Opinion 12-02, supra note 8, at 9 (stating
that the term "offeror" was not intended to encompass daily
deal websites; however, arrangements can be tailored to
comply with the safe harbor).
"3 See OlG Anti-Kickback Provisions Response to
Comments and Summary of Revisions, 56 Fed. Reg.
35,952, 35,956 (July 29, 1991) (declining to shield an
entity from criminal or civil prosecution for technical or de
niinimis violations of the regulatory safe harbors).
14o See Shaw, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (stating that
discounting must be based on the understanding that the
discount can only pass to the federal government if it is
made aware of the discounts).
141 See Advisory Opinion 12-02, supra note 8 at 3, 9-10
(finding it significant that the coupons themselves applied to
the entire item or service, not just the customer's cost).
142 See id. at 10 (declining to offer safe harbor protection to
potential parties involved in the proposed management since
parties were not joined in the request of the opinion and did
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not provide certifications of compliance with the discount
safe harbor).
143 See Shaw, 106 F Supp. 2d at 119 (concluding that the
question of whether disclosures are proper and appropriate
depends on the details of the transaction and other evidence
proffered at trial under the scrutiny of a jury).
1'4 See, e.g., Ternis and Conditions, LIVING SoCIAL, http://
livingsocial.com/terms#certain conditions.placed on
your use of the-site and-services (last visited Aug. 20,
2012) (failing to make the proper disclosures to comply
with the discount safe harbor in its terms of use).
145 See United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 E2d 173, 177
(7th Cir. 1980) (finding that paying for the opportunity to
provide services billable to Federal health care programs
constitutes an illegal use of federal funds).
146 See id. at 177 (stating that the potential for increased
costs to the federal government is evident where payments
are made to influence the judgment of the relevant decision
maker); cf United States v. Miles, 360 F.3d 472, 480
(5th Cir. 2004) (finding it significant that alleged illegal
remuneration occurred after a physician already decided
to use defendant's home health care services for which the
defendant would pay a fee to a PR agency who advertised to
physicians on its behalf).
147 See Clarification of Safe Harbor Provisions and
Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions, 64 Fed.
Reg. 63,518, 63,528 (Nov. 19, 1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
Part 1001) (noting that Congress intended the regulatory
safe harbors to both incorporate and enlarge upon the
statutory discount exception found in the anti-kickback
statute).
148 See id. (explaining that an offeror is not the seller of the
item or the service but provides a discount on an item or
service to a buyer).
149 See id.
Iso See, e.g., Advisory Opinion 12-02, supra note 8, at 9
(permitting the requestor to structure its daily deal website
to fall within the discount safe harbor although the daily
deal website was not an offeror within the meaning of the
safe harbor).
'51 See United States v. Shaw, 106 F Supp. 2d 103, 112 (D.
Mass. 2000) (stating that it was Congress's intent to have
the regulations updated periodically when it granted the
OIG authority to protect certain arrangements).
12 See id. at 115 (explaining that the discount exception
to the anti-kickback statute was passed to encourage a free
health care market system so that the federal government
could reap cost-saving benefits).
153 See, e.g., LIVING SOCIAL, supra note 6 (failing to specify
whether discounted membership in a medical group will
translate to discounted services billable to Federal health
care programs).
154 See Advisory Opinion 12-02, supra note 8 (blessing
a proposed daily deal website partly because third party
payors, including the federal government, would benefit
from the reduction in cost of the item or service).
15 See Clarification of Safe Harbor Provisions and
Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions,
64 Fed. Reg. 63,518, 63,528 (Nov. 19, 1999) (codified
at 42 C.ER. Part 1001) (allowing certain coupons and
discounts to qualify for safe harbor protection as long as the
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arrangement meets the requirements of the discount safe
harbor provision).
156 See 42 U.S.C § 1320a-7b(b) (2006) (prohibiting
remuneration offered directly, indirectly, overtly or
covertly).
1s1 See Advisory Opinion 12-02, supra note 8, at 11
(narrowly tailoring a favorable opinion to the proposed
arrangement and explicitly disclaiming reliance on the
opinion by any other individual or entity).
15 See id. at 8-9 (stating that advertising which is only
displayed on a website and not targeted toward customers
using the website does not raise significant anti-kickback
concerns).
15 See Zimmer v. Nu Tech Med., 54 F Supp. 2d 850, 855
(N.D. Ind. 1999) (rendering a percentage compensation
agreement unenforceable under the anti-kickback statute
because both parties had significant financial incentives to
engage in abusive marketing and billing practices).
16o See issuance of Advisory Opinions by OIG, 62 Fed.
Reg. 7,350, 7,351 (Feb. 19, 1997) (codified in 42 C.F.R.
Part 1008) (stating application of safe harbor is appropriate
where an arrangement contains limitations, requirements or
controls that adequately assure federal health care programs
cannot be abused).
6' See 64 Fed. Reg. at 63,528 (explaining that the safe
harbor provisions protect all discounts protected by
Congress in the statutory discount exception found in the
anti-kickback statute).
162 See United States. v. Shaw, 106 F. Supp. 2d 103, 112
(D. Mass. 2000) (outlining the expansion of the regulatory
safe harbor provisions to encompass innovative payment
practices).
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